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A growing literature documents the presence of appearance premia in labor markets. We
analyze appearance premia in a high-profile, high-pay setting: head football coaches at big-
time college sports programs. These employees face job tasks involving repeated interpersonal
interaction on multiple fronts and also act as the “face” of their program. We estimate the
attractiveness of each employee using a neural network approach, a pre-trained Convolutional
Neural Network fine tuned for this application. This approach can eliminate biases induced by
volunteer evaluators and limited numbers of photos. We also use this approach to estimate the
perceived aggressiveness of each employee based on observable facial features. Aggressiveness can
be detected from facial characteristics and may be a trait preferred by managers and customers
in this market. Results show clear evidence of a salary premium for less attractive employees.
No beauty premium exists in this market. We also find evidence of an aggressiveness premium,
as well as evidence of higher attendance at games coached by less attractive and more aggressive
appearing coaches, supporting customer based preferences for the premia. We also provide a
methodological contribution by incorporating face recognition and computer vision analysis to
evaluate employee appearance.
JEL Codes: C45, J71
Keywords: Beauty premium; facial recognition; machine learning; college football
∗Benjamin M. Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources, Lane Department of Computer Science and
Electrical Engineering, 109 Research Way, Morgantown, WV 26505, USA; Email: guodong.guo@mail.wvu.edu
†Corresponding author. John Chambers College of Business & Economics, Department of Economics, 1601 Uni-
versity Ave., PO Box 6025, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA; Email: brhumphreys@mail.wvu.edu
‡Benjamin M. Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources, Lane Department of Computer Science and
Electrical Engineering, 109 Research Way, Morgantown, WV 26505, USA; Email: monouyed@mix.wvu.edu
§John Chambers College of Business & Economics, Department of Economics, 1601 University Ave., PO Box
6025, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025, USA; Email: ygzhou@mix.wvu.edu
1We thank participants at the Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference and the Western Economic Asso-
ciation International Conference and seminar participants at the West Virginia University Department of Economics
for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction
Labor market discrimination represents an important, widespread and widely studied economic
outcome. Discrimination against unattractive workers recently became a prominent area in this
literature. This outcome, called the “beauty premium,” refers to the idea that more attractive
people earn a premium in labor markets (Scholz and Sicinski, 2015). While the beauty premium
may reflect employer or customer tastes, some research posits an alternative productivity-based
explanation where physical attractiveness enhances worker productivity, primarily in jobs involving
substantial interpersonal interaction (Stinebrickner et al., 2018).
The idea that attractiveness enhances productivity rests on heterogeneity in the beauty premium
across job types, in terms of task requirements. Hamermesh et al. (1994) posited that the beauty
premium affects people in jobs with substantial personal interaction, since attractiveness might be
productivity enhancing in that setting. No productivity-enhancing effects of attractiveness should
exist in jobs that involve working with numbers, information, or data.
The impact of attractiveness has been studied intensively in other social science disciplines
like sociology and psychology. Hamermesh et al. (1994) undertook the first economic research on
the topic. Since then, a growing body of economic research on the beauty premium emerged, in-
cluding Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) analyzing lawyers’ looks and lucre, Hamermesh and Parker
(2005) analyzing instructors’ pulchritude and student ratings, Mocan and Tekin (2010) analyzing
physical attractiveness and criminal activity, Berggren et al. (2010) and Berggren et al. (2017) ana-
lyzing attractiveness and voter appeal, and others. A small, growing literature in sports economics
also emerged, primarily focused on professional athletes (Berri et al., 2011; Ahn and Lee, 2014;
Bakkenbüll and Kiefer, 2015; Dietl et al., 2018; Yamamura et al., 2018).
A lack of data sources containing both physical attractiveness measures and individual labor
market outcomes represents an obstacle to economic research in this area. Hamermesh et al. (1994)
exploited two novel large-scale surveys that contained a variable describing the attractiveness of
each interview subject based on the opinion of the survey interviewer who observed the subject
in person during the interview. Researchers often exploit existing one-off data that contain pho-
tographs and employ relatively small numbers of volunteer evaluators who examine the photos and
rate the physical attractiveness of each or self assessed attractiveness (Mocan and Tekin, 2010).
Many studies use relatively small numbers of evaluators; for example, Ahn and Lee (2014) use
only 16 evaluators and Scholz and Sicinski (2015) use 12. Use of a small number of evaluators to
generate attractiveness measures can introduce bias into the process because of evaluator prefer-
ences or measurement error associated with the photographs. This problem may be amplified by
the common practice of rating a single photograph of individuals in the sample.1 We provide a
methodological contribution by developing a computer vision analysis of facial characteristics to
assess attractiveness using standard tools from the computer science literature on facial recognition
that can be readily applied to electronic images, eliminating the need for costly, time consuming
1Exceptions include (Scholz and Sicinski, 2015) who use five different photographs of each person in the sample,
Dietl et al. (2018) (three photos) and Ahn and Lee (2014) (two photos).
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human evaluation.
Research on the beauty premium among professional athletes faces an additional challenge:
athletes evaluated in terms of attractiveness are famous and successful and evaluators may conflate
success and fame with beauty, generating biased attractiveness measures. Berri et al. (2011) and
Dietl et al. (2018) address this issue by using a one-dimensional computer vision measure of attrac-
tiveness, facial symmetry, to quantify attractiveness. Berri et al. (2011) use Symmeter2 to rate the
attractiveness of NFL quarterback’s faces and generate a facial symmetry score for each. Dietl et al.
(2018) use Prettyscale3 to generate a facial symmetry score based on 14 facial landmarks manually
placed on photos of 128 professional tennis players. Research in evolutionary biology (Perrett et al.,
1999) supports the idea that facial symmetry represents an important one-dimensional component
of attractiveness. We use a multidimensional approach for assessing attractiveness.
While economic research generally focuses on the impact of perceived attractiveness on economic
outcomes, other research focuses on the impact of alternative observable facial characteristics. Peo-
ple frequently infer personal traits and characteristics based solely on observed facial features (Willis
and Todorov, 2006) which could affect many outcomes. Todorov et al. (2005) investigate the im-
pact of perceived candidate competence based on facial photographs on electoral outcomes and
find that candidates perceived as more competent were more likely to win elections. Willis and
Todorov (2006) assess the link between observed facial characteristics and five different individual
traits (trustworthiness, competence, likeability, aggression, and attractiveness) and find that indi-
viduals form clear opinions about possession of each of these traits after very short exposure to
photographs.
Mueller and Mazur (1996) found that West Point cadets perceived as having dominant faces,
based on evaluators’ assessments of yearbook photos, rose to higher ranks in the military over
the course of their careers than cadets perceived as having less dominant facial characteristics.
Duarte et al. (2012) found that individuals perceived as more trustworthy based on evaluations
of photographs had higher credit scores and lower loan default rates. If perceived attractiveness
generates labor market impacts, these other perceived personal characteristics based on photographs
may also affect labor market outcomes, depending on the task requirements of specific jobs.
We investigate the effect of perceived employee facial characteristics in a high-pay occupation
with tasks involving extensive personal interaction, including employee, peer, customer, and me-
dia interaction. The head coach of an National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) football
bowl subdivision (FBS) team, the largest and highest profile category of college football, interacts
extensively with current players, recruits, assistant coaches, the media, fans, alumni, donors, ref-
erees, university administrators, and others. These interpersonal interactions have an important
effect on job performance and may affect productivity. We find no evidence of a beauty premium
in this setting, which provides important new evidence that limits to the beauty premium exist




football coaches earn a salary premium relative to more attractive coaches after controlling for job
performance, a novel finding in this literature.
Nearly all previous studies use volunteers, often students, to assess the attractiveness of individ-
uals in the sample, often from a single photograph. We use a machine learning approach to identify
specific facial features associated with attractiveness in a generic set of photographs and train a pre-
diction model based on this evaluation. Our attractiveness measure comes from a machine learning
approach that applies estimates from training on generic photographs to photographs of football
coaches. This can mitigate some bias in attractiveness ratings due to the evaluation procedure.
We also assess attractiveness based on multiple photographs for each employee, which can mitigate
measurement error associated with single photographs of individuals.
We use 2,222 facial images and associated characteristics from the MIT 10k US Adult Faces
Database (Bainbridge, 2017). We identify crucial facial features associated with men being attrac-
tive or unattractive and aggressive or not aggressive using a supervised learning approach. We use
this information to rate the “attractiveness” and “aggressiveness” of all NCAA FBS head coaches
from 2014 to 2016 based on publicly available facial photos and analyze the relationship between
these facial features and salary, controlling for job performance. Empirical analysis reveals a beauty
discount and aggressiveness premium in this labor market.
Another issue in the beauty premium literature is the possibility that attractive individuals
may sort into jobs where they have a productivity advantage (jobs with substantial interpersonal
interaction), which would generate a beauty premium in jobs with certain characteristics but would
not reflect underlying discrimination against unattractive people. Our setting should not include
sorting by attractiveness. Almost all head football coaches are former college and/or professional
football players, which requires exceptional physical ability likely unrelated to attractiveness (no-
body ever got a football scholarship because they were exceptionally attractive). So this specific
occupation features a significant entry barrier that cannot be overcome by attractiveness alone,
reducing the potential impact of sorting on attractiveness into occupations. Our finding of a pre-
mium for unattractive coaches may reflect widespread sorting in other occupations with no such
entry barriers.
We also assess the impact of an alternative personal trait that can be determined from a pho-
tograph and could be either productivity-enhancing or preferred by employers and customers: ag-
gressiveness. Little economic research analyzes the presence of earnings premia for personal traits
other than attractiveness. Aggression represents an important characteristic of football players;
this could carry over to coaches, given their goal of winning games and leading successful college
football programs. We find evidence of a salary premium earned by coaches with facial character-
istics perceived as aggressive. To our knowledge, no previous research identifies a salary premium
associated with characteristics other than attractiveness in the economics literature.
Perceived aggressiveness based on observable facial characteristics could plausibly affect labor
market outcomes. Aggressive behavior can be predicted from observable facial characteristics based
on laboratory and field evidence (Carré and McCormick, 2008; Carré et al., 2009). A biological
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basis supports this relationship; research links an observable male facial characteristics, a larger
facial width-to-height ratio, with higher measured levels of circulating blood testosterone (Lefevre
et al., 2013). Increased blood testosterone could affect workplace productivity.
Finally, no evidence exists in the literature on the extent to which discrimination comes from
employer-based preferences or customer-based preferences. We develop new evidence of fan based
preferences for unattractive head coaches who look aggressive. More fans attend games coached
by unattractive men relative to attendance at games coached by more attractive men, controlling
for team success. This suggests that college football fans have a preference for less attractive head
football coaches.
2 Beauty Advantage, Face Recognition, and Machine Learning
2.1 Beauty Advantage in Economics
Hamermesh et al. (1994) undertook the first research on the beauty premium in economics. This
paper used interviewers’ ratings of the physical appearance of respondents to three broad-based
household surveys, two in the United States and one in Canada, to develop evidence supporting a
beauty premium in the labor market. In these survey data sets, the interviewers rated the intervie-
wee’s physical attractiveness from 5 (homely) to 1 (strikingly attractive) during in-home interviews.
Following this paper, most empirical research on the beauty premium used personal attractiveness
measures based on the opinion of one or more individuals based on in-person observation of the
individual being analyzed, or more commonly, a photograph.
Hamermesh et al. (1994) found that more beautiful people earned more, even in jobs where
physical appearance had little to do with job performance. They reported a premium for above
average attractiveness of about 5% and a penalty for below average attractiveness of about 7%.
Their study suggests the existence of pure employer discrimination.
Following Hamermesh et al. (1994), a growing body of economics literature developed evidence
of a beauty premium. Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) develop evidence of a beauty premium for
lawyers. Hamermesh and Parker (2005) study the relationship between the teachers’ beauty and
find evidence suggesting that attractive teachers receive higher evaluations.
Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) further explored transmission channels from beauty to earnings
in an experimental setting. 50 high school students rated individual attractiveness based on pho-
tographs of 330 experiment participants. They found a sizable beauty premium and identified three
possible transmission channels: (1) more attractive people are more confident which increases their
salaries; (2) even with equal confidence levels, employers consider more attractive people to have
higher abilities; and (3) more attractive people actually have better “soft” skills like communication
and social skills, which help them earn more.
Mocan and Tekin (2010) analyzed the relationship between attractiveness and criminal activity.
They found that young adults with a more self-identified ugly look had a higher propensity to
commit crimes, and that beauty in high school influenced teenagers’ criminal behavior years later.
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Berggren et al. (2010) investigated the beauty premium in political voting. If voters lack suf-
ficient background information on candidates, then an overall impression of a candidate’s physical
appearance will influence voters’ decisions. This happens frequently. Many voters only see photos
of candidates on print media or images on other advertisements. This study used relatively large
samples of both photos and reviews: 1,929 Finnish political candidates and evaluations by 10,011
respondents, of which 3,708 were Finnish. Berggren et al. (2017) further investigated whether the
beauty premium differs for candidates with different political ideologies, because voters’ preference
may vary across social groups. They found that candidates on the right received higher attractive-
ness evaluations. One explanation for this is that beautiful people earn more, which makes them
less inclined to support economic redistribution. This study also contained an experiment, which
generated similar evidence.
Some existing research focuses on the existence of a beauty premium in sports. Sports represents
an interesting setting for analyzing the beauty premium because of the ready availability of photos
of athletes, salary data, and individual performance data. Berri et al. (2011) used the Symmeter
program to assess the facial symmetry of photos of 138 NFL quarterbacks, along with annual
performance and salary data over the period 1995 to 2009, and found evidence of a beauty premium.
Facial symmetry represents one aspect of beauty. A change in facial symmetry from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above among NFL quarterbacks lead to an
11.8% salary increase, or about $338,000.
Ahn and Lee (2014) studied 132 female golfers appearing in at least one of the four major
professional tournaments during the 2010 Ladies Professional Golf Association tour and annual
performance and earnings data over the period 1992-2010. Ahn and Lee (2014) use ratings of
photos from 16 volunteer evaluators as the beauty measure. Although they do not find any direct
evidence of beauty premium leading more prize money in golf tournaments, they do find evidence
that attractiveness generates an effort-enhancing effect: more beautiful golfers put more effort into
the competition, perhaps because of a higher return to human capital for more attractive female
golfers. This represents a potential mechanism through which beauty affects earnings. Ahn and
Lee (2014) report that a one standard deviation increase in their beauty rating from the mean
generated a $127,520 increase in tournament prize money, a 31% increase.
Yamamura et al. (2018) use direct evaluations of male and female Japanese speedboat racers’
attractiveness to analyze the performance of these athletes. The attractiveness evaluations came
from student recruits. They found that more attractive racers are more popular than their com-
petitors, even after controlling conditions of the race, racer ability, and other characteristics. They
further find that this “beauty premium” makes popular male racers perform better, but there is
no such an effect for female racers. These results show that the productivity-enhancing effects of
attractiveness in sport reported by Ahn and Lee (2014) generalize to sport, and may depend on
gender.
Dietl et al. (2018) analyze the effect of attractiveness on television audience size in professional
tennis using data from Switzerland. They analyze over 600 quarterfinal, semifinal and final Grand
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Slam match broadcasts over the period 2000 to 2016 and use facial symmetry to proxy for at-
tractiveness from the Prettyscale program. Unlike many other papers, they analyze the effect of
attractiveness of both male and female tennis players. A one standard deviation in female facial
symmetry increased television audience size by 24% but an increase in male facial symmetry did not
increase television audience size. This suggests that customer discrimination could be the source
of the beauty premium. The novel use of television audience size, a direct measure of demand,
generates this.
Bakkenbüll and Kiefer (2015) analyzed the productivity-enhancing effect of attractiveness in
female tennis players. Attractiveness measures come from an on-line survey administered to stu-
dents who rated pictures of the athletes on an eight point scale. About 20 students rated each of
100 photos of female tennis players. They find that a one point increase in attractiveness increased
annual prize money winnings by about 30% and career to date prize money winnings by about
20%, implying a sizable productivity effect for attractive female tennis pros.
All the research surveyed above used either direct ratings of photos from volunteer evaluators
or one-dimensional geometric beauty measures (facial symmetry) from computer vision analysis
of photos. The first approach may suffer from biases if using a small number of evaluators. The
symmetry-based computer vision methods lag behind the current state of the art in facial recog-
nition research. While facial symmetry probably matters, it may not be an adequate measure of
attractiveness because it reflects only one aspect of facial characteristics.
Substantial research on facial recognition and the assessment of attractiveness exists beyond
symmetry. Recent research in the computer science literature focuses on how to use more advanced
computer-based methods to evaluate attractiveness and other characteristics that go beyond ap-
pearance from facial photos. Kagian et al. (2008) employed a machine learning predictor of facial
attractiveness to reveal human-like psychological biases. Altwaijry and Belongie (2013) also used
a machine learning approach to rate the attractiveness of photos. For more details of the current
computer science literature on beauty rating, Laurentini and Bottino (2014) provide a very detailed
overview.
Todorov et al. (2005) surveyed individuals who were asked to infer the competence of politicians
from facial photos and then used these evaluations to predict voting results based on the assumption
that voters prefer competent politicians. Difference in the photo-based evaluation of candidate
competence predicted actual voting outcomes in 68% of the US Senate races in 2004, indicating
that inferred personal traits based on facial photos provide useful information.
In terms of perceived aggressiveness based on facial characteristics, evidence of the importance
of observable facial characteristics and actual aggressiveness exists. Prior research clearly links the
perception of aggressiveness based on observable facial characteristics to actual aggressive behavior
in the laboratory and the field in males. Carré and McCormick (2008) assessed the face width-to-
height ratio (fWHR) of photographs of 88 undergraduate students and then performed laboratory
assessments of their level of aggression. Males with a larger fWHR were more aggressive than
those with a smaller ratio and also more aggressive than women with similar ratios. Carré et al.
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(2009) report similar lab-generated results. Carré and McCormick (2008) also obtained photographs
of every player on eight Canadian National Hockey League teams for the 2007-08 season and
estimated their fWHR. Variation in the estimated face width-to-height ratio in this sample explained
a significant portion of variation in aggressiveness, as measured by penalty minutes per game for
each player over the course of the season. Players with larger fWHR spent more time in the penalty
box per game than players with smaller fWHR.
A biological basis for a link between observable facial characteristics and aggression also exists.
Observable facial characteristics, in particular the facial width-to-height ratio, has been linked to
aggressive behavior in males and to higher testosterone levels. Lefevre et al. (2013) found that
males with a higher fWHR had higher measured levels of circulating testosterone in their blood.
Higher levels of testosterone causes more aggressive behavior in males.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from three sources. The first consists of salary information for
all NCAA FBS football head coaches from 2014 to 2016 taken from the USA Today college football
coach database.4 We augment the head coach salary data with annual team performance data from
https://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/.
The second is the MIT US 10k Adult Faces Database (Bainbridge, 2017), which contains 10,168
facial photos reflecting the gender, age, and racial distributions of the adult U.S. population. From
these 10,168 photos, 2,222 were randomly selected as target images and 6,468 constitute filler
images. Information on 20 observable attributes were collected for each of the target images,
including attractiveness and aggression using evaluations from two different Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) surveys with 12 and 30 different participants.
The final data source contains photos of all NCAA FBS football head coaches from 2014 to
2016 directly downloaded through Google Image Search. The method for downloading these photos
included a search using the college and coach name as key words and then selecting the one most
clear, large, and directly facing the camera.5 Although we use our best judgment when selecting
photos, some bias could be introduced through this process. Therefore, we download two additional
photos for every coach and used the average rating of the three photos as the beauty measure.6
The final sample contained 384 coach-year performance and salary observations from 2014 to 2016.
The salary data contains 361 observations because of missing salary data for coaches employed at
private universities, leaving 361 observations in the analysis sample.
4https://www.usatoday.com/sports/
5For consistency only one coauthor collected all photos.
6Most of the photos downloaded are facial. Some contain shoulders, arms, and other body parts. No photo
contains just the face and nothing else, and even the facial photos contain at least some background images. Because
the photos are “read” by computer a few photos with low pixels or other issues can not be processed. All three photos
were read successfully for nearly all coaches.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Wins 6.668 3.122 0 14
Losses 5.803 2.475 1 12
Salary ($000) 2,002 1,563 225 9,004
Age 50.817 8.202 34 77
Experience 9.269 8.018 0 34
Tenure at Current School 4.064 4.592 0 28
Attractiveness Score 3.227 0.569 1.403 4.519
Aggressiveness score 5.266 1.369 1.588 8.797
N=361
Table 1 contains summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. Win, the
number of wins by a team in a season, varies from 0 to 14. Loss, the number of losses by a team
in a season, varies from 1 to 12. A typical college football team plays about 12 games per season,
although successful teams may play more. Depending on their performance in the regular season,
a team attending playing in a bowl game or the Championship Playoffs might end up playing 14
games. Salary is total salary of coach, which varies from $225,000 to more than 9 million US
dollars. The empirical models use the log of this variable Log Salary in the regression models.
We also capture the total years of head coaching experience (Experience) and tenure of each
head coach at his current school, and their age. Note that Experience and Tenure atCurrent School
are not the total years they have been a head coach or the head coach of this school, but are the
number of years since the first time they served as a head coach or the head coach of this school.
Data on coaches’ age and career experience come from information on official team web sites and
their Wikipedia pages.
The Attractiveness Score and Aggressiveness Score reflect evaluations of observable character-
istics of each coach, based on the computer vision/machine learning approach discussed in detail
in the following section. The machine learning approach used here generates continuous variables.
These variables reflect the assessed attractiveness of each coach based on a continuous variable
defined over the interval (1,5) where 5 is the most attractive coach and 1 is the least attractive, and
the assessed aggressiveness of each coach based on a continuous variable defined over the interval
(1,9) where 9 is the coach assessed as most aggressive and 1 is the least aggressive. The scales
differ because the assessment questions appeared in different modules of an on-line survey. Most
economics research uses discrete measures of attractiveness based on Likert-scale questions about
attractiveness answered by volunteer evaluators.
Figure 1 contains selected photographs of coaches in the sample and their estimated attrac-
tiveness score to provide examples of unattractive and attractive head coaches. The attractiveness
score for each photo is shown below the photo.
At the left of Figure 1, Tracy Claeys, head coach at the University of Minnesota in 2015 and
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Figure 1: Attractiveness Scores for Selected Images
2016 has among the lowest attractiveness scores in the sample. Next, Kevin Sumlin, head coach
at Texas A&M University throughout the sample, also has a relatively low attractiveness score. In
the middle of Figure 1, Willie Taggert, head coach of the University of South Florida throughout
the sample has an attractiveness score in the middle of the range, a slightly below average score.
At the right on Figure 1, two of the coaches with higher attractiveness scores are Les Miles, head
coach at LSU throughout the sample, and Tony Levine, head coach of the University Houston in
2014 has among the highest beauty scores in the sample.
Note that the photo of Les Miles has a different expression than the others. The machine
learning approach used to generate beauty scores does not depend on facial expression. We know
this because the pre-trained deep learning model used for this research has very high face recognition
accuracy in real world face data sets where face images come from an unconstrained environment
with varied expression, illumination, pose, and so forth (Wen et al., 2016).
Figure 2 shows estimated aggressiveness scores for selected photographs. Recall that the ag-
gressiveness score uses a 1 to 9 scale. At the top left of Figure 2, John Bonamego, head coach at
Central Michigan University in 2015 and 2016 has among the lowest aggressiveness scores in the
sample.
Ohio State coach Urban Meyer, third from the lest in the top row, has a below average aggression
score (3.47). Venderbilt head coach Derek Mason (4.64) and Toledo head coach (in 2016) Jason
Candle (5.83) have slightly below and slightly above average aggressiveness scores. At the bottom
right of Figure 2, Jim Harbaugh, Michigan head coach in 2015 and 2016 has among the highest
aggressiveness scores in the sample. Note that attractiveness scores and aggressiveness scores are
correlated (see Figure 6 for details).
3.2 Face Recognition and Machine Learning
The facial characteristic evaluation scores for employees in the sample come from a computer
vision machine learning approach. This section describes the neural network architecture used for
training the beauty and aggressiveness prediction models and provides details about the training
set construction.
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Figure 2: Aggressiveness Scores for Selected Images
We begin from a standard source of facial photographs, the MIT 10k US Adult Face Database.7
This database of facial images contains about 10,186 natural photographic images. The photos are
representative of the US population in terms of age, gender, and race. 2,222 of the photos have a
rich set of attributes attached to them, including attractiveness ratings with a range from 1 to 5 (a
higher score means more attractive) and aggressiveness ratings with a range of 1-9. See Bainbridge
et al. (2013) for details on the database and Khosla et al. (2013) for details on the attributes.
The next section contains details on how the attractiveness and aggressiveness scores were
estimated. The procedure uses a Convolutional Neural Network, a standard neural network archi-
tecture.
3.2.1 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Architecture
The face image database and corresponding facial attributes data, can be used to train a neural
network to analyze facial characteristics of any photograph. We use a pre-trained Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) architecture model proposed by Wen et al. (2016) for face recognition,
and perform a transfer learning approach called “fine-tuning” to learn to predict attractiveness
and aggressiveness scores for our assessment of facial characteristics of FBS head football coaches.
Again, the use of pre-trained CNNs and transfer learning for the analysis of facial photos is standard
in the machine learning. This CNN has been used extensively in the literature (Wen et al., 2016).
CNNs use filters to extract image characteristics. A filter is a 2-dimensional array applied to the
7https://www.wilmabainbridge.com/facememorability2.html.
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digitized face image to extract specific features. Each filter element contains a set of weights, and
these weights are updated iteratively based on a loss function using a back-propagation algorithm.
The gradient descent optimization algorithm uses back-propagation to ensure that the weights are
updated in such a way that the loss decreases as training images are iteratively passed through the
network. At each training iteration, the weights are updated for the entire training set as the value
of the loss function decreases. After a certain number of iterations, if the value of the loss function
is reasonably small, the network has successfully learned to discriminate among face images with
different attractiveness (or aggressiveness) levels.
A deep CNN is a hierarchical feature learner. At the bottom layers it learns to discriminate
among small, finer aspects of photos, such as edges, textures etc, and in the subsequent layers
progressively larger image characteristics are analyzed, such as parts of faces or whole face area.
The fine tuning, or transfer learning, process freezes all convolution layers except the local conv5
layer, as shown in Figure 3. The local convolution layer is a group of convolutions pooling and
rectifying linear unit operations, followed by an element wise operation to combine the output with
the pooling layer. The freezing retains the weights for low level features learned by training using
the original large-scale face data set while tuning the higher level features capturing characteristics
reflecting beauty or aggression. Figure 3 shows the CNN architecture and fine tuning components
of the process. Note that, even though the same architecture is used, separate neural networks were
trained to perform the transfer learning for attractiveness and aggressiveness score prediction.
Figure 3: CNN Architecture (Wen et al., 2016) Frozen and Fine Tuning Layers
While the training and test photo sets come from different sources, both sets of photos contain
images with good resolution and close frontal poses, well illuminated faces, and sharp images, which
are the major sources of quality degradation in computer vision. We assume both the training and
test photo sets have the same distribution of facial characteristics. Using a separate beauty dataset,
SCUT-FBP5500 (Liang et al., 2018), and the associated different training protocol, we used 10
different common deep learning face recognition models with alternative parameter tuning and
layer freezing approaches. We found the Wen et al. (2016) deep architecture to produce the best
predictive results in terms of mean absolute error (MAE) and mean squared error (MSE) among
this group of models. We use the same architecture for attractiveness and aggressiveness prediction
because, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time facial aggressiveness prediction has
been done using a deep learning model. We lack an earlier source as a reference to select a suitable
training model. Since this architecture performed reasonably well for predicting attractiveness, it
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should provide reasonable estimates of aggressiveness after fine tuning.
3.2.2 CNN Training Details
Preprocessing
Initially, facial landmarks on photographs of football coaches were identified using the method pro-
posed by Baltrusaitis et al. (2013). This method identifies 68 separate facial landmark points like
eyebrows, eyes and lips. We use 5 of these landmarks in preprocessing: Eye centers, nose tip, and
mouth corners. Using these landmarks, we align each face image using an affine transformation,
crop the image to a uniform size (96 × 112) and save it in RGB format. Figure 4 shows the face
landmark detection, alignment and cropping phases for a sample face image from the football coach
photos analyzed. The photo is of Air Force Academy head coach Troy Calhoun.
Figure 4: Face Preprocessing - Sample Image
Training Data
We collect 2,222 images with information on attractiveness and aggression from the MIT data base
and use a data augmentation process to increase the size of the training set to improve the neural
network performance. Since we quantify beauty and aggression, we need to be careful not to dis-
tort images in a way that loses finer image features that convey information about attractiveness
or aggression. We avoided adding noise, smoothing, or adjusting the contrast and brightness of
the images to create new samples for the training set. Instead, new samples were created using
mirroring, rotation, and shift. For each sample, 39 additional images were created through this
process for each existing photo in the training set, which leads to an augmented image data set with
2,222×40=88,880 observations. Training labels for facial attractiveness range from 1 to 5 with con-
tinuous values, where 1 indicates least attractive and 5 most attractive. For aggression, the ratings
range from 1 to 9 with 1 indicating least aggressive and 9 the most aggressive. Note that, discrete
score levels from the two AMT surveys were used to assess attractiveness and aggressiveness, the
ratings for each image from the human raters were averaged to generate a single score per image.
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This real valued score is used as the training label for the face images.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Settings
To update the weights on the labels we use a Euclidean loss function. Because we work with train-
ing labels with continuous values this can be addressed as a regression problem. The Euclidean






||ŷn − yn||22 (1)
where N is the number of training samples, yn is the ground truth label from the MIT 10k database,
and ŷn is the predicted label from the CNN. The training was done over 300,000 iterations, using a
batch size of 10. The training used a fixed learning rate 1e−7 , momentum 0.9, and weight decay
0.0001.
After training, the football coach photos are analyzed by the corresponding trained CNN to
generate attractiveness and aggression scores for each coach’s photo. These scores are averaged
across photos for each coach to arrive at the attractiveness and aggressiveness values used in the
empirical analysis. The attractiveness score for every coach is continuous over the interval 1-5 and
the aggressiveness score is continuous over the interval 1-9. The intervals differ in the original
MIT 10k data. From Table 1, the minimum average attractiveness score of a coach is 1.403, the
maximum is 4.519, and the mean is 3.227. The aggressiveness score variable has substantially more
variation around the mean than the attractiveness score variable.
3.3 Econometric Methods
We use an OLS model to explain observed variation in annual salaries earned by NCAA FBS head
coaches. The key explanatory variables of interest are measures of the perceived attractiveness and
aggressiveness of each coach based on a machine learning approach to evaluating their photographs.
Like Berri et al. (2011), Dietl et al. (2018), Stinebrickner et al. (2018) and others in this literature,
we use a single attractiveness and aggressiveness score value for each coach over the sample and
estimate a pooled OLS model, even though we explain variation in salaries over three seasons.
Like Berri et al. (2011), we assess the validity of this approach by estimating alternative model
specifications that collapse all variables to sample averages.
The main empirical model is
Sist = βAi + ψZist + εist. (2)
Sist denotes the (log) salary of college football coach i coaching at school s in season t. Ai is the
attractiveness score or alternatively the aggressiveness score estimated for coach i. Zist includes
control variables reflecting coach and team performance and characteristics: number of wins by the
football team under coach i at school s in season t, total years of experience for coach i in season t
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and coach i’s tenure at school s. εist is the error term. The error term is assumed to be distributed
with mean zero and constant variance.
Note that, like all papers in this literature, we cannot identify a separate head coach fixed effect
and an effect of attractiveness and aggression. We can only identify and estimate a school fixed
effect, based on schools who employed more than one coach in the sample. 40 of the 128 schools
in the sample changed coaches, including three at Illinois, so we should adequately estimate school
fixed effects.
4 Beauty and Aggressiveness Premia Estimates
4.1 Nonparametric Graphic Results
We first generate nonparametric graphic results to show the basic relationship between attractive-
ness score and salaries in the data. We first estimate a model explaining log salary of coach i at
school s in year t
Sist = ψZist + εist. (3)
using coach/school characteristics and school and season fixed effects. We then take the residuals
from this model and estimate a local polynomial regression model that uses higher-order functions
of the attractiveness score and separately the aggressiveness score to generate nonparametric salary
gradients as functions of attractiveness and aggressiveness. The 95% confidence interval for the
local polynomial salary gradients are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows the basic attractiveness (left panel) and aggressiveness (right panel) results.
Controlling for coach success, age, and experience, less attractive coaches earn higher salaries.
The effect becomes significant at attractiveness scores a bit over 2. Some nonlinearities exist, but
attractive head football coaches do not earn a premium. Instead, unattractive coaches earn a
premium relative to attractive coaches.
The salary gradient for the aggressiveness score shows evidence of an aggressiveness premium
for aggressiveness scores over about 8. This relationship might exhibit nonlinearity that takes a U
shape, although the significance of the salary increase at the low end of the aggressiveness score
distribution appears weak. Head coaches assessed as very aggressive earn premium, while those in
the middle of the distribution do not.
4.2 Pooled OLS Model Results
The primary regression results are displayed in Table 2. Given the evidence from the salary gradients
above, we include squared terms for the attractiveness and aggressiveness scores to capture any
nonlinearities in the relationships. These models control for coach productivity and experience, but
do not control for school or year fixed effects.
More successful or productive coaches earn higher salaries across all model specifications. The
return to experience at the coach’s current school, his tenure at that school, is also positive across
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Table 2: Beauty and Aggressiveness Premia - Pooled OLS Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Attractiveness −0.222∗∗∗ −0.965∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −1.433∗∗
(0.077) (0.529) (0.082) (0.576)
Attractiveness2 0.120 0.179∗∗
(0.085) (0.090)
Aggressiveness 0.056∗ −0.245 0.103∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.032) (0.168) (0.033) (0.181)
Aggressiveness2 0.029∗ 0.009
(0.016) (0.017)
Wins 0.088∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Log Age −0.191 −0.199 0.402 0.322 0.008 0.016
(0.402) (0.402) (0.397) (0.398) (0.403) (0.402)
Experience −0.000 0.001 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Tenure at Current School 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.199 0.204 0.188 0.195 0.220 0.232
N 361 361 361 361 361 361
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 5: Salary Gradients - Local Polynomial Model
all model specifications.
Model 1 contains only the attractiveness score and Model 2 adds the square of the attractiveness
score. The premium paid to unattractive head coaches clearly emerges in these results, although
the results are stronger when the attractiveness score enters linearly. The salary premium for a one
unit decrease in the attractiveness score is 0.222 log points, or a salary increase of about 22%. A
one unit decrease is a bit less than two standard deviations for the attractiveness score variable,
based on the reported standard deviation on Table 1.
Model 3 contains only the aggressiveness score and Model 4 adds the square of the aggressiveness
score. Evidence of an aggressiveness premium is present but weak in Models 3 and 4. While a
10% significance level may seem generous, the data set contains only 361 observations. One reason
for the weaker relationship may be the U-shape of the salary gradient for aggressiveness shown on
Figure 3. The estimated aggressiveness premium for Model 3 is equivalent to a 5.6% increase in
salary for a one unit increase in the aggressiveness score. A one unit increase in the aggressiveness
score is a change of less than one standard deviation.
Model 5 includes both the aggressiveness score and the attractiveness score, generating attrac-
tiveness premium estimates holding aggressiveness constant and aggressiveness premium estimates
holding attractiveness constant. Figure 6 shows the relationship between aggressiveness and attrac-
tiveness in the sample. Given the positive relationship, both variables belong in the same regression
model to avoid omitted variables bias.
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Figure 6: Aggressiveness and Attractiveness
ρpearson = 0.426, ρkendall = 0.241, ρspearman = 0.346
Model 5 results contain clear evidence of both an aggressiveness premium holding attractive-
ness constant and a premium for unattractive head coaches holding aggressiveness constant. The
unattractiveness premium for a one point decrease in the attractiveness score is about 32% and the
aggressiveness premium is about 10% for a one point increase in the aggressiveness score.
4.3 Fixed Effects Model Results
A first set of robustness checks are shown in Table 3. These models control for coach productivity
and experience, and both school and year fixed effects. These models control for any potential
correlation between unobservable time-invariant school-specific effects and the attractiveness and
aggressiveness of the school’s head football coach. For example, if administrators at a particular
school tended to hire particularly attractive or aggressive head football coaches.
Sist = βAi + ψZist + Cs + Yt + εist. (4)
Where every item in Equation (4) is the same as that in Equation 2, but two fixed effects are
added. Cs is a school fixed effect and Yt is a season fixed effect.
First, note that including school fixed effects in the empirical model changes the statistical
significance of the estimated parameter on the wins variable. This three season period contains
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Table 3: Beauty and Aggressiveness Premia - School Fixed Effects Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Attractiveness −0.122∗∗ 0.381 −0.158∗∗ 0.671∗
(0.051) (0.316) (0.062) (0.346)
Attractiveness2 −0.085 −0.134∗∗
(0.053) (0.056)
Aggressiveness −0.012 −0.297∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.339∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.098) (0.027) (0.105)
Aggressiveness2 0.028∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Wins −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log Age 0.416∗ 0.436∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.425∗ 0.517∗∗
(0.230) (0.230) (0.223) (0.220) (0.230) (0.225)
Experience −0.002 −0.003 −0.005 −0.006 −0.001 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tenure at Current School −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 361 361 361 361 361 361
R2 0.976 0.976 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.977
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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relatively low variation in the number of wins across the sample, reflecting a general lack of churn
in terms of successful and unsuccessful teams. From Table 1 the standard deviation of the wins
variable is about 3 wins per season. If successful teams win between 6 and 12 games per season
(9 ± 3) mediocre teams between 3 and 9 games (6 ± 3) and unsuccessful teams between 0 and 6
games (3 ± 3) on average, then the addition of a school fixed effect would be expected to reduce
the estimated statistical significance of the wins variable. Also, the estimated parameter on the
age variable becomes statistically different from zero with the predicted sign.
Evidence of beauty and aggressiveness premia remain on Table 3. Again, Models 1 and 2
contain only the attractiveness score and its square, Models 3 and 4 contain only the aggressiveness
score and its square, and Models 5 and 6 contain both. The results for Model 1 support a linear
attractiveness discount. Results for Model 4 support a nonlinear, U-shaped aggressiveness premium.
Taken together, Results from Models 5 and 6 support the presence of both. The main results appear
robust to the inclusion of school and year fixed effects.
4.4 Collapsed Average Model Results
Again, the attractiveness and aggressiveness scores effectively represent a coach fixed effect. We
follow Berri et al. (2011) and check the robustness of the main results by estimating alternative
models that collapse the sample to average values. This reduces the sample size by a factor of three,
so some loss of statistical significance should be expected. Figure 7 shows the nonparametric salary
gradients for the attractiveness and aggressiveness scores. The salary gradient for the attractiveness
score is virtually unchanged from the full sample results on Figure 5. The salary gradient for the
aggressiveness score loses significance at the ends of the distribution, but the general U-shaped
relationship still appears.
Table 4 contains the corresponding regression results. The layout of the results on Table 4 are
the same as for Tables 2 and 3 above. Models 1 and 2 contain only the attractiveness score and its
square, Models 3 and 4 contain only the aggressiveness score and its square, and Models 5 and 6
contain results with both variables included.
In general, the results on Table 4 support the robustness of the main results, a premium paid to
unattractive coaches and to coaches who appear to be aggressive. While many estimated param-
eters lose statistical significance due to the reduced sample size, the estimated parameters on the
attractiveness and aggressiveness score variables in Model 5 strongly resemble those from Model 5
from the pooled OLS results on Table 2.
5 Fan Preferences
5.1 Fan Preferences Results with Attendance Data
Why do unattractive and aggressive NCAA FBS head football coaches earn salary premia? Theory
identifies two potential sources: discrimination on the part of either managers or fans, or alterna-
tively the personality traits associated with perceived facial attractiveness or aggression increase
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Table 4: Beauty and Aggressiveness Premia - Pooled OLS Collapsed Average Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Attractiveness −0.182∗ −1.032 −0.301∗∗ −1.523∗
(0.109) (0.744) (0.117) (0.793)
Attractiveness2 0.140 0.200
(0.121) (0.126)
Aggressiveness 0.069 −0.266 0.120∗∗ −0.011
(0.045) (0.240) (0.048) (0.254)
Aggressiveness2 0.033 0.015
(0.023) (0.024)
Wins 0.131∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Log Age 0.072 0.075 0.619 0.542 0.284 0.301
(0.583) (0.582) (0.575) (0.576) (0.579) (0.578)
Experience 0.000 0.002 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Tenure at Current School 0.035∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.033∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
R2 0.229 0.235 0.226 0.237 0.259 0.277
N 156 156 156 156 156 156
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 7: Collapsed Sample Salary Gradients - Local Polynomial Model
productivity. The empirical models above control for head coach productivity by including the
number of wins for each team in the model. The school fixed effects models should partially control
for preferences of administrators for attractive or aggressive head football coaches, to the extent
that these preferences are time-invariant over the three year sample period.
In this context, we have access to information on fan preferences for head coach attractiveness
or aggressiveness in the form of attendance at football games. If fans prefer to watch college
football games coached by attractive or aggressive, then attendance at games coached by attractive
or aggressive coaches would be higher, other things equal.
To investigate the role played by fan preferences in driving the attractiveness and aggressiveness
premia documented above, we replace the log salary dependent variable in Equation (2) with the log
of total attendance at home games played by the team at school s coached by coach i in season t and
re-estimate the model. Table 5 lists the summary statistics for the observations when using home
average attendances as the dependent variables. The data source for home average attendances are
from the official website of NCAA.8 Since the data for home attendance have have full information,
we have 380 observations in the analysis.
Table 6 contains results for the pooled OLS model, and the layout of the results on Table 6 are




Table 5: Summary Statistics for Attendance Regressions
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Wins 6.639 3.101 0 14
Losses 5.821 2.463 1 12
Average Home Attendance 42,424 25,985 4,897 110,468
Age 50.639 8.162 34 77
Experience 9.068 8.015 0 34
Tenure at Current School 3.903 4.562 0 28
Attractiveness Score 3.221 0.571 1.403 4.519
Aggressiveness score 5.260 1.352 1.588 8.797
N=380
Table 6: Beauty and Aggressiveness Scores and Home Attendance - Pooled OLS Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Attractiveness −0.102∗ −0.780∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −1.106∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.367) (0.058) (0.395)
Attractiveness2 0.110∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.059) (0.062)
Aggressiveness 0.043∗ −0.147 0.066∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.023) (0.120) (0.024) (0.128)
Aggressiveness2 0.019 0.006
(0.012) (0.012)
Wins 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log Age 0.189 0.201 0.507∗ 0.457 0.334 0.375
(0.282) (0.281) (0.280) (0.281) (0.285) (0.284)
Experience −0.005 −0.003 −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tenure at Current School 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
R2 0.211 0.219 0.212 0.217 0.227 0.242
N 380 380 380 380 380 380
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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the same as the other tables above. Models 1 and 2 contain only the attractiveness score and its
square, Models 3 and 4 contain only the aggressiveness score and its square, and Models 5 and 6
contain results with both variables included.
The results strongly resemble those using log salary in terms of sign and statistical significance
of parameter estimated. Winning teams draw more fans, other things equal. The longer the tenure
of the current coach at a school, the higher is attendance, other things equal.
For the parameters of interest that reflect the effect of the facial attractiveness and aggressive-
ness of the head coach, Model 5 again generates results indicating that more fans attend games
coached by less attractive head coaches, and more fans attend games coached by men who’s facial
characteristics are more aggressive. Since revenues increase with attendance, these results indicate
that fan preference for head football coaches with specific facial appearances drives some of the
attractiveness and aggressiveness premia present in this market.
Figure 8 shows the nonparametric attendance gradient based on estimation of Equation (3)
using log home attendance as the dependent variable. Again, this model contains coach success,
age, and experience and regresses the residuals from Equation (3) on higher order polynomial
functions of the attractiveness score and the aggressiveness score for each head coach.
Figure 8: Attendance Gradients - Local Polynomial Model
Figure 8 also shows clear evidence of higher attendance at games coached by less attractive men,
holding team success, coach age, experience, and tenure. College football fans exhibit preferences
for less attractive head coaches. The nonlinear U-shape in the attendance gradient for aggressive
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appearance can also be seen, but the statistical significance of this effect is weaker.
5.2 Mechanisms for a “Reverse” Beauty Premium
Why do less attractive FBS head coaches earn a salary premium compared to more attractive
coaches? The existing literature generally finds a beauty premium for men but not for women.
Attractiveness generates a differential salary effect across genders. The underlying mechanism
could be that the effect of attractiveness on manager or customer decisions also varies by gender.
For example, attractive male lawyers may have a larger effect on decisions made by female jurors
than on male jurors. Attractive male salesmen may have a bigger influence on female customers
than attractive female saleswomen on male customers.
One important form of personal interaction in this occupation is to convince 17 to 18 year old
football recruits to play on their team. This is primarily male-male personal interaction. In this
type of personal interaction, being a less attractive male might be productivity enhancing, as a
less attractive male recruiter could be less threatening or intimidating to a potential recruit. More
attractive male recruiters could raise issues related to sexual orientation that adolescent males
might find uncomfortable. Little known about heterogeneity in the effect of beauty on managers
or customers. In terms of attendance, most college football fans are male and might have a similar
aversion to attractive male coaches (“I’m not watching that pretty-boy coach my team.”) This
could generate lower attendance.
Another explanation is that some other aspects of unattractiveness may be productivity en-
hancing in college football coaching. For example, if unattractive men are less likely to be married,
then they would have more time to spend on the long hours involved in coaching football at the
highest level, especially early in their career.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the beauty premium of college football coaches in United States from
2014 to 2016. Using a face recognition and machine learning approach, we digitize and map 2,222
photos from the MIT Face Photo Database and capture the crucial features of this mapping. With
the beauty reviews combined, we capture the main features and their contributions to reviews’
evaluation of the beauty degree of a face photo. We further digitize the face photos of all the
U.S. college football coaches from 2014 and 2016 and evaluate their beauty based on the surprised
learning approach.
Empirical analysis suggests that a more attractive football coaches actually face a salary dis-
count, rather than a premium. Instead, FBS head coaches with a more aggressive visage earn a
salary premium. One explanation for an attractiveness discount and aggressiveness premium may
stem from the fact that American football is a very aggressive sport, and an unattractive face
might signal mental and physical toughness, viewed as a desirable characteristic in this market.
We find evidence suggesting an overall premium for more aggressive coaches, and also evidence of a
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non-linear U-shaped relationship. Various robustness tests all suggest that our findings of a beauty
discount and aggressiveness premium are robust.
Our research contributes to the current literature in three ways. First, the face recognition and
machine learning approach is new and straightforward to implement, which enables researchers
to evaluate the attractiveness of any facial photo with sufficient pixels, rather than having to
recruit evaluators to sit down and do manual assessments. This comprehensive face mapping and
machine learning approach reflects a more complex and comprehensive measure of attractiveness
than one-dimensional measures like symmetry. Second, the beauty discount found contracts results
in the literature, which suggests that whether commonly perceived beauty generates a premium
or discount reflects specific labor market factors. Finally, our paper is the first to study and find
evidence of an aggressiveness premium, which extend economists’ understanding of the extent of
observable factors influencing labor market outcomes.
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